The language of partial order time expresses the issues central to many problems in asynchronous distributed systems. A secure partial order time service would provide a general method to develop secure protocols for these problems. In this paper, we s k etch out these issues and develop one such protocol: signed v e ctor timestamps. The majority of this paper is drawn verbatim from the rst author's October 1991 thesis proposal, the rst research into security issues for non-scalar time services and the original presentation of the SVT protocol.
Introduction
The language of partial order time expresses the issues central to many problems in asynchronous distributed systems. A secure partial order time service would provide a general method to develop secure protocols for these problems. In this paper, we s k etch out these issues and develop one such protocol: signed v e ctor timestamps. This paper is drawn verbatim from the rst author's October 1991 thesis proposal 1 20 , except for minor edits, the concluding Sections 5 and 6, and this paragraph. The original proposal document gives the rst research i n to security issues for non-scalar time services and the original presentation of the SVT protocol. It has recently come to our attention that this protocol was later independently rediscovered. 18 Traditionally, w e regard time as a scalar value, totally ordering on the events in a system. However, the very nature of asynchronous distributed systems suggests that we should use an order that is partial, not total, so that we can deliberately leave unordered two separated events that have no knowledge of each other. In this partial order time model, both the presence and the absence of a path between two e v ents carry meaning|whether one event necessarily precedes the other, or whether they are concurrent. If we use merely a total order, we lose the latter information.
Many problems in distributed systems reduce to questions about this partial order. Our current research explores building tools that explicitly grant these abilities, thus providing a general method to develop protocols to solve problems in this class|known problems that currently have separate ad hoc solutions, and also new problems that arise from this uni ed framework. Our research also explores making these tools robust for various models of Byzantine failure and information con nement; thus, protocols based on these tools will be secure and robust, since they will inherit the security properties already present in the toolkit.
Partial Order Time
Partial order time provides an alternative w ay to order events in an asynchronous distributed system. The goal of the rst author's thesis 21 is to design a family of protocols that allow processes in a system to examine local events in terms of this time model.
The concept of partial order time solves some of the di culties introduced by merging independent timelines into the same totally ordered stream. Using only a partial order on events lets us ensure that event a happens after" event b if and only if a can observe the results of b|total orders only allow the converse direction. Deliberately leaving unordered two e v ents that lie outside each other's observation cone" frees us from the paradoxes of con icting knowledge horizons.
A total order is consistent with partial order when a b = a b . If we think of orders as a set of ordered pairs, than a consistent total order is just a total order that contains the partial order as a subset. Any partial order extends to a consistent total order; further, the set of consistent total orders uniquely characterizes a partial order. Research o n concurrent systems raises ideas of partial order time precisely because of the need to reason about this entire set. Total order time|even the total order provided by real time|provides only one member.
Formal De nitions
We base our partial order time model on Lamport's. 11 Formally, let us de ne an event t o be an instantaneous, atomic action within a system as per Mattern 14 . Each e v ent takes place at one speci c process. We partition events into three categories:
1. send events, in which one process sends a message to another 2. receive events, in which one process receives a message from another 3. internal events|anything else that happens within a process Send events take place at the sending process; receive events at the receiving process. Note that since communication is asynchronous, a send event d o e s n o t h a ve t o b e s i m ultaneous with a receive event; depending on the failure model we use, a send event m a y n o t e v en have a corresponding receive.
Isolating each e v ent in a distributed system|e.g., requiring each process to throw a way its state after each e v ent|would render irrelevant any discussion of event ordering. Only when events can observe the results of previous events does the issue arise of deciding which events are indeed previous." To capture this notion of previous," we will construct the basic partial order BPO on events: we will write a,!b to indicate the event b potentially depends on event a: that is, event a must be in the past in the timeline experienced by b. One interpretation of the BPO is that it expresses the basic ow of causality; a less mystical interpretation is that it speci es some minimum required level of structure in possible time sequences.
To de ne the BPO, we proceed from two basic rules:
Recall that we assume that uniprocessors can totally order their own events. If events a and b occur on the same process and a precedes b in this order, then let a,!b. Processes only in uence other processes by sending messages, and are in uenced only by receiving them. So, if a is the sending of a message and b is reception of that message, then a,!b.
Formally, w e let the BPO be the transitive closure of this relation. Note that for two events a and b, exactly one of three cases holds. 2 a,!b: b depends on a b,!a a 6,!b and b 6,!a; in this case, we say that a and b are concurrent.
We will write a 6 ! b to indicate the latter relationship.
The Graph Interpretation
Interpreting the BPO as a directed acyclic graph DAG makes discussing some of its properties easier. Construct a node for each e v ent in the system, and draw directed edges according to the two basic rules above. Then the relation a,!b holds exactly when a path exists from a to b.
Regarding the BPO as a graph|without transitive closure|allows us two d i e r e n t w ays to de ne restrictions on a BPO. Let S be a subset of the events perhaps those events occurring at some subset of the processes.
We construct the nontransitive restriction of the BPO to S simply by deleting all nodes not in S, and all edges incident to these nodes. We construct the transitive restriction of the BPO by rst taking the transitive closure of the graph, and then deleting the nodes and edges not in S. This is the standard restriction for partial orders.
We will use the notation a S ,!b to indicate that event b depends on a under the nontransitive restriction of the BPO to S, a n d aŜ ,!b under the transitive restriction.
Secure Clocks for Partial Order Time
This paper proposes a secure toolkit for distributed partial clocks. We n o w o er a more detailed discussion on what we m e a n b y this|Section 3.1 presents the basic issues involved in de ning these clocks, and Section 3.2 examines security and robustness issues.
Clocks for Partial Order Time
The problem of robustly implementing a traditional clock on a distributed system where by clock" we refer to a global event counter, although some ideas extend to approximations of real time is di cult but solvable e.g., 12 , 13 , 22 . Researchers observe that a necessary condition for distributed clocks is that the total order calculated be consistent with the BPO.
That is, the system computes a time function T, mapping events to integer timestamps, such that for all events a;b, Ta T b = a,!b
However, we stress the importance of a system being able to calculate the BPO exactly. Our goal is to implement a distributed p artial clock: w e w ant a timestamp set, with partial order ; a function T from events to timestamps satisfying Ta Tb a,!b; and the ability for processes within the distributed system to compute the function T and the comparison .
More precisely, w e w ant our partial clock toolkit to enable processes to be able to calculate these functions for the events they know about: process P i need only calculate T and on some subset E i containing the events perceivable by P i . De ning this notion is a bit tricky. The weakest nontrivial de nition follows:
if event a occurs at P i , then a 2 E i if event a is the sending of a message to P i , which P i received, then a 2 E i Note that this is nontrivial because, if events a;b are the sending of messages to process P i and event c is internal, then answering the questions of whether a,!b or c,!a may require information not easily available to this process. This de nition is still rather weak: suppose the message sent to process P i in event a at process P j contains information about events preceding a? One could argue that P i ought to be able order those event t o o . 2 Further, suppose that event b is the reception at process P j of message m sent b y e v ent a at P i .
Should b 2 E i ? Clearly P i knows that its event a in uenced b|but does P i necessarily know that b exists?
In the spirit of saying that our de nition of BPO is purely syntactic, we claim that this weak de nition of E i is the corresponding purely syntactic version. As with BPO, we c a n construct more complicated extensions of this basic concept by considering other issues.
Security Issues
The problems of robustness and security in distributed partial clocks take t wo forms: fault tolerance, and some special challenges the nature of partial clocks creates for information con nement.
Fault Tolerance
A natural question to ask when considering a distributed system that consists of a physically distributed collection of machines is: what happens when one of them goes awry? In our distributed systems model we h a ve several elements: physical processors communication links between processors processes running on processors Physical machines can fail either gracefully or maliciously; processes can be downright malevolent; processes go into suspension while their machine is down, or when they move operation to a di erent machine; communication links can deliver messages out of order, or garbled, or not at all.
In the remainder of this paper, we m a k e the simplifying assumptions that each process resides on its on processor, and that the network never corrupts messages.
We w ould like our distributed partial clocks to maintain some kind of reasonable performance in the face of such troubles. We can imagine the standard spectra measuring severity of individual failures and number of such failures, with a family of implementations that achieve increasing levels of performance on these spectra, probably by trading o against simplicity and e ciency, and by balancing the various types of robustness.
However, a new issue is exactly what we should regard as reasonable performance." The functions we wish our clocks to calculate capture distributed, global properties. Even though events a and b might occur in the immediate proximity of a process P i e.g., in the weakest E i , the individual arcs in the BPO graph that cause a,!b to hold might be distributed throughout the entire system. We could require the nonfaulty processes to calculate the BPO correctly on their perceivable events; less strongly, w e could restrict these events to those belonging to nonfaulty processes so we absolve nonfaulty P i from any confusion that a message from a faulty process causes. Some of our work already suggests even weaker fault tolerance: requiring nonfaulty processes only to calculate the nontransitive restriction 3 of the BPO to the set of nonfaulty processes. Each of these cases partitions the set of processes, and hence the set of events, into nonfaulty and faulty categories, but only speci es how e v ents in the former should be handled. How nonfaulty processes should deal with bad events raises another set of research questions.
Information Con nement
To illustrate another set of security issues, we n o w consider an especially naive implementation of partial clocks. Suppose a distributed system explicitly maintains the BPO graph.
After initialization, each process starts building a linear chain of its internal events. When sending a message, a process sends along its chain; when receiving a message, a process incorporates the graph information contained into its own graph. Consequently, whenever a process executes an event, it knows the entire BPO subgraph induced by taking all the ancestors of that event. This implementation allows processes to calculate the T and relations. However, even aside from questions of e ciency and fault tolerance, this implementation would be unsatisfactory in two crucial areas: reasons of security policy and reasons of innate causality m a y render it undesirable or impossible for a process to know the complete history behind every event.
Con nement b y policy. Recall in Section 3.1 we o ered a weakest de nition of the events perceivable by a process: E i , consisting of the events internal to process P i and the send events of messages received by process P i . In many real instances of distributed systems we m a y w ant to enforce an information con nement rule such as process P i can know nothing of the global BPO graph except its transitive restriction to E i , unless authorization is explicitly granted in some way."
For example, consider distributed workstations in a university e n vironment. Just because Alice sends a message to Bob does not mean Bob has the right t o k n o w e v erything Alice has been doing. We need to consider con nement from the future as well: professors Bob and Carla may need to have a lengthy discussion of student Alice's proposal|but naturally Alice should not be privy to this discussion, or even to the fact that a lengthy discussion of my proposal is going on."
We formalize these concepts by i n troducing two new terms:
forward c on nement: keeping private information about a process from leaking to processes it in uences in the BPO backward c on nement: keeping private information about a process from leaking to processes that have in uenced it
Enforcing principles of forward and backward information con nement raises some interesting implementation challenges. Let a be a send event a t p r o c e s s P 1 , a n d l e t e v ents b at P 2 and c at P 3 be in the future of a that is, a,!b and a,!c and suppose processes P 2 and P 3 need to know di erent details of the history of a in order to timestamp b and c, respectively. Forward con nement requires that P 1 not transmit this information with a. But backward con nement requires that P 2 and P 3 cannot just query P 1 ! Con nement b y structure. Con nement principles are just that|principles we impose for reasons external to the basic problem of tracing causality. However, some common system mechanisms create information barriers that fundamentally a ect this basic problem. Suppose student Alice sends an anonymous suggestion to the suggestion box m a i n tained by Professor Bob for his class, who acts on this suggestion. Bob's actions depend on Alice's suggestion|but he cannot know whose action this suggestion is. Further, the suggestion is not completely anonymous, for in her later interactions with Bob, Alice knows that Bob's actions follow from her actions. Greif 7 calls this the phenomenon of hidden causality, and gives a more fundamental example: the relation between V and P operations on a binary semaphore.
How to resolve the problem of hidden causality in a distributed partial clock is another research issue we i n tend to explore. We m a y need to extend the BPO formalism to make i t su ciently rich to express all these nuances. 4 . The SVT Protocol
Overview
The central issue in building a secure distributed partial clock toolkit is how t o k eep track of the partial order. Essentially, our BPO is a dynamically changing directed acyclic graph whose behavior meets the following criteria:
Monotonicity. As real time progresses, edges and nodes are added. In the basic problem, nothing is deleted.
Distribution. New nodes originate from individual processes within a distributed system; new edges from either individual processes or in the case of message transmission from pairs of processes.
Our toolkit needs to allow individual processes to answer connectivity queries about this graph, and hence must maintain this graph, at least in some virtual form. The distributed nature of the DAG forces processes to require nonlocal information in order to answer these queries. The issue of how and when this information should propagate|piggybacked on system messages, or transmitted only when requested by a query|delineates one axis of possible implementation approaches.
In this section we outline a starting point for our implementation work: signed v e ctor timestamps SVTs. This approach falls at the piggyback" end of this axis. The SVT protocol extends Lamport event counters to provide an implementation of distributed partial clocks that is moderately robust against Byzantine failure. We conjecture that this may b e the best protection possible if we disallow any special underlying computational structure.
However, this initial approach o ers two principal drawbacks: ine ectiveness at enforcing forward con nement, and computational ine ciency in certain scenarios. Analyzing these drawbacks suggests several new directions for implementation research.
We begin by discussing Lamport clocks Section 4.2, then extend them to vectors Section 4.3, and then turn to SVTs: the protocol, its problems, and the new research a venues suggested Sections 4.4 and 4.5. 7
Lamport Clocks
Lamport 11 discusses the issue of determining the BPO and presents an elegant partial solution using local event counters. Timestamps sent along with every message keep the local counters roughly synchronized, and capture a total order 4 consistent with the BPO. Formally, each process P i maintains a local scalar clock C i . Process P i marks each e v ent a that occurs there and each message m it sends with a timestamp Ca o r Cm, which re ects the current v alue of the clock C i . This current v alue changes with each e v ent a at P i ; the type of event determines the change. However, this method has two principal drawbacks|it only produces a total order the converse to Theorem 1 does not hold, and it is egregiously unsecure, as each process's clock is essentially world-writable. For example, suppose process P i has C i = s and receives a message m from process P j with Cm = t s. Ostensibly, the timestamp t testi es that at least t , s events have occurred in the outside world since P i last received a message.
But P i cannot distinguish this presumed scenario from one where malicious process 5 P j arbitrarily in ates the timestamp. After all, such maliciousness o ers advantages: 6 If P i lacks a sensibility c heck" on its timestamps but plans to interact with process P k that does, then P j 's action causes P k to erroneously identify P i as faulty. If processes store timestamps as a xed-length word with maximum value N, then P j could use t = N ,1 and cause P i to roll over, either making P i appear faulty or causing dangerous anachronism. 4 Strictly speaking, it produces a partial order, as events at two processes could receive the same value timestamp. But we can easily linearize this order by c hoosing a linear order on the processes and using that order to break ties. 5 We o versimplify here|consider that P j itself may only be the last link in a chain of honest processes unwittingly passing on bogus information introduced by the malicious process. 6 Again, actual scenarios may b e e v en more complex: P i may be just a link in a chain to reach t h e i n tended victim process.
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If processes store timestamps as unbounded values, P j could still increase by orders of magnitude the numb e r o f w ords P i uses for its clock. This both slows down P i 's dealings with its neighbors, and allows P j to observe the spread of its in uence|a violation of backward con nement. If P j interacts with most processes fairly regularly, then it can render the entire clock system e ectively useless by blowing up every timestamp with each message.
Extending Lamport Clocks to Vectors
Our SVT implementation extends Lamport counters by making timestamps vectors instead of scalars, and incorporating digital signatures. These extensions rectify the cited drawbacks.
In the vector timestamp protocol, processes maint a i n a v ector indicating their knowledge horizon"|the most recent e v ent they syntactically know about at each other process. Technically, w e should note that this structure is not so much a v ector but an indexed set: the length need not be xed, nor the indices known a priori. This raises some interesting research questions regarding what to do with lost or missing members. The SVT protocol extends this by using public key decryption to authenticate these timestamps.
The vector timestamp protocol exactly captures the BPO. The SVT protocol even allows the set of honest processes|no matter how few|to calculate the nontransitive restriction of the BPO despite any action whatsoever by malicious processes. The concept of using dependency vectors without authentication surfaces in earlier research e.g., 23 , 15 , 5 , 6 , but this paper is the rst to consider these vectors as an implementation for a general purpose, secure partial clock toolkit.
The remainder of this section presents the basic protocol, and Sections 4.4 and 4.5 add authentication.
The Vector Timestamp Protocol
We begin by discussing the basic protocol, without authentication. Let n be the number of processes. Each process P i maintains a local clock C i , a n e v ent c o u n ter. Each process also maintains an n-element v ector V i to keep track of the most recent e v ent i t k n o ws about at every other process. We will use the notation V i j to refer to the jth component o f vector V i |this component re ects process P i 's most current knowledge of process P j . W e can dispense with C i altogether, and just store the value as V i i. Let each component o f each V i be zero initially.
Each process will timestamp its events and outgoing messages with an n-element v ector. To follow our previous notation strictly, w e should denote these timestamps by V a; however, to make component indexing easier, we will use subscripting instead: V a is the timestamp on event a, V m on message m. The following table outlines how processes obtain these timestamp vectors and update their own vectors. Let event a occur on process P i . The reason for the two increments in send events may n o t b e i n tuitively clear. We increment the local component before sending a message so that the receiving process can treat all components equally when maximizing. We increment again so that the subsequent event at the sending process will not precede the receive e v ent.
We de ne a natural ordering on the timestamp vectors.
De nition 2 For vectors V;W, we say that V W when 8i V i Wi and 9i V i
Wi.
This ordering exactly captures the BPO. 
Security Problems
Consider the timestamp vector V i on process P i . It is true that the components V i j are world-writable for i 6 = j in the sense that a party sending P i a message can force these components arbitrarily high. If P k has V k j = 42 for k;j;i distinct, then P k c a n s e n d a message to P i and know that afterward, V i j 42. If P k is malicious, then it can render the vector V i e ectively useless. But assume for the moment t h a t e v eryone is honest. Let 0 be the initial value of all vector components. Process P k can change a component of its vector in only two w ays: it can increment its own component V k kV k k + 1 or it can copy other components from incoming messages V k j maxfV m j; V k jg
The vector on a message is just a copy o f t h e v ector at the sending process. Hence we c a n observe: Theorem 4 Let a be an event on process P i , and let j 6 = i. Then V a j is either 0 or is a copy of V m j, where m is a message sent by event b at process P j , a n d b,!a.
So processes now h a ve some means of detecting when someone is sending them bogus information in a message's timestamp: they know t h a t e a c h nonzero component j of the timestamp should have been originally generated by process P j .
SVT: Adding Signatures to the Vectors
By adding signatures to the vector timestamp scheme, we can add tolerance against Byzantine faults|arbitrary behavior by arbitrary numbers of processes.
Let us assume a public key decryption scheme, where for any x each process P i can generate a signature E i x s u c h that any process P j can, given x,i, a n d y, quickly determine whether y = E i x for j 6 = i, a n y nite set X, and any x 6 2 X, no process P j can calculate E i x, even if it has an oracle for E i on X.
We directly extend the basic vector timestamp protocol to produce the secure protocol SVT. Namely, w e just include and check signatures.
Every vector V will now have t wo elds in each component|the actual value V i, and the signature V i In the other direction, we can show something a bit stronger. A nice thing to observe about SVT is that honest processes do not need to know which other processes are honest.
Problems with the SVT Implementation
The SVT protocol has several drawbacks. For one thing, its tolerance of Byzantine failure is not ideal|the reasonable performance" it achieves falls short of what we w ould have desired. We suspect that this behavior may be inherent for this style of implementation. Another problem is that the amount of information that SVT timestamps contain violates forward con nement and, in certain situations, might be rather ine cient.
Lost In uence
In Section 3 we state that a central goal of this work is to discover a protocol by which a n honest process P i can determine the BPO among its perceivable events E i . The SVT protocol does not achieve this goal. It is true that in SVT, a malicious process cannot overwrite the clock v alues of other processes, and cannot generate arbitrarily large values in timestamp components corresponding to honest processes. However, the protocol does permit spoo ng in the sense of Herlihy a n d T ygar 9 . During the course of system operation, a process will receive many timestamp pairs x; E i x for many o f t h e i. A process is supposed to use the largest x it has received in each component, but it can use any other one it wants to.
For example, suppose Alice and the Bank are honest, but Carla is pretty n a s t y. Suppose Alice deposits $10 in her previously empty bank account, and then gives Carla a check f o r $10. Carla can roll back all her timestamps and quickly cash the check|and the Bank would believe that Alice's request depends on Carla's, and thus will execute Carla's rst, getting Alice into trouble.
The problem remains that any dealings with dishonest or faulty processes will be suspect. We conjecture 8 that this behavior is inherent for a large family of implementations: any protocol built around the following assumptions will risk losing chains of in uence through malicious processes. 7 Actually, the question of whether Theorem 6 is stronger than the converse of Theorem 5 is not answered so easily: we could interpret proving the latter as being able to distinguish a H ,!b from a,!b, w h i c h broaches the awkward topic of honest processes identifying the dishonest ones. Research questions remain here. 8 Since the preparation of the original document i n 1 9 9 1 , w e h a ve formalized and proved this conjecture. The proof will appear in the rst author's thesis. 21 the processes themselves do all the computation|nothing is hidden or unconscious no honest process has a right t o k n o w a n ything about the internal events of any other process 4.5.2. Con nement and E ciency Since SVT timestamps are real data packets which e n tirely determine event ordering, the SVT implementation easily enforces backward information con nement. A process examining a timestamp does not need to bother anyone else. However, a cursory inspection of the protocol reveals a a fundamental violation of forward con nement: the fact that processes must pass on the most recent timestamp components from everyone in the system.
If the distribution of messages is fairly uniform, then SVT is reasonably e cient. But the real world contains highly non-uniform scenarios. For example, consider a system consisting of clusters of workstations at various universities. Most of the communication takes place within each cluster, so the system graph has two fairly densely connected components, with only a few edge between the components. If we h a ve n processes and only n messages across this cut, then we're transmitting much extra data| n w h e n w e really only need O 2 .
One can argue similarly that much of the timestamp information in a tightly coupled cluster is irrelevant, as everyone knows everything already. This situation is troublesome because of redundant data, rather than unnecessary data. Some fairly straightforward methods exist to reduce this waste|consider that process P 1 can obtain from the timestamps it exchanges with process P 2 a g o o d l o wer bound for each component i n P 2 's internal vector, and only needs to transmit the components that exceed this bound. 9 
Future Work
The traditional way to regard time is as a linear order on the events in a system|for any pair of distinct events e 1 ; e 2 , o n e m ust have happened before the other. By deliberately leaving unordered events that did not in uence each other, the BPO opens the door for more general classes of temporal orderings.
Besides being of theoretical interest e.g., Pratt 17 , these alternative time models have some exciting implications for asynchronous distributed systems. Partial orders in form or another lie at the heart of many application problems. 10 For example:
Tracking concurrency. In terms of the partial orders, the distributed snapshot prob- 9 After the 1991 document, we discovered that Singhal and Kshemkalyani 19 had previously examined some optimization techniques for vector timestamp protocols. 10 Tracking reverse in uence. The problem of orphan detection requires determining,
given event e 1 , i f a n y aborts preceded it. Protocols based on linear time orders only detect a superset of what in uenced e 1 ; protocols based on partial orders give the set exactly.
In his thesis proposal 20 , the rst author argues that solving such application problems requires rst solving the problem of maintain partial order information, and hence these solutions to these application problems will automatically inherit the security problems of partial order clocks. Hence developing a theory of partial order time and encapsulating its clock primitives and security issues into a single package will provide a framework for building secure protocols for these general application problems. Forthcoming publications will expand on this research.
